These past four raids have all been of the same caliber, so feel justified in writing of them in the same light ... tough, rough, long in hours, and touching on the very brim of Hell. (Herman F. Allen, February 1944)
When I first began to read Herman’s missions’ diary I thought it puzzling that he had written detailed accounts of Missions 1 through 7 but Missions 8, 9, 10, and 11 were all combined on one page.
Now I know why. I have read Donald L. Miller’s “Masters of the Air.” It was Big Week.
The Air Force desperately wanted to send massive day-after-day-after-day strikes against the German aircraft factories. Just as important as destroying the Luftwaffe fighter factories was to demolish the fighter planes that would inevitably attack the B-17’s as they flew to and from the enemy targets. This raid was originally scheduled for November 1943 but the bad weather prevented what was called Operation Argument.
It was critical that the Luftwaffe fighter force be significantly decreased so that they would not be able to hamper the huge land invasion that was being planned for Normandy.
Operation Argument would see enormous formations of B-17’s fly into Germany on February 20, 21, 22, 24, and 25. A trusted meteorologist had predicted that this was the best and possibly only time they would have 5 days in a row of tolerable weather. By February the B-17’s were able to count on support from a greater number of long range fighter escorts so the delay from November in that respect was a good thing.
As it turned out, the weather on the first day was miserable, with icy conditions. There were conflicting opinions among the Air Force leadership as to whether the strike should go on or not. It went.
Herman and his Liberty Lady crew flew on February 20, 21, 22 and 24.
These past four raids have all been of the same caliber, so feel justified in writing of them in the same light … tough, rough, long in hours, and touching on the very brim of Hell. (Herman F. Allen, February 1944)
Barbara Ann
Posted at 04:35h, 04 AprilPatti, so glad you are back and writing again. You have such an art of bringing the Herman diary to life and explaining it so well. We are all blessed by what you are doing, especially the extended Allen family. Thank you.
Rowdy
Posted at 12:43h, 27 AprilBig Week was Jimmy Doolittle’s first major command decision after he took command of the Eighth during in early 1944. Coupled with the introduction of more and more long range fighter escorts, the attack on the Luftwaffe was very, very effective. After Big Week the Luftwaffe was increasingly less anxious to come up and engage the bomber stream and its escort. They had rightly determined that they could not train new pilots fast enough to make up for their losses. Interestingly, they could produce aircraft in sufficient quantities, but not the pilots.
By the time my father started flying his missions in early March 1944, Doolittle was growing impatient with the diminished opportunities to destroy the Luftwaffe…they wouldn’t come up and fight! He reasoned (LeMay was in on this, too) that if they were to attack Berlin, Germany’s capital, the Germans would be hard pressed to ignore the attack. He was right. Dad’s first 3 missions were the Eighth’s first daylight missions to Berlin. And the infamous 6 March mission was the costliest in terms of aircraft lost by the Eighth–69!
Now, Berlin wasn’t an important strategic target, but it was certainly an emotional morale target and the Germans fought like fury to defend it…and lost a lot more aircraft in the process. Unknown to my father and most of the young airmen in those bomber streams was that they were being used as bait on those first missions to Berlin to draw the Luftwaffe up. General Lew Lyle tells this story very vividly on a DVD entitled something like “Start Your Engines +50 Years.” He was then a Group commander and following a meeting with Doolittle wanted to make sure he had heard correctly…Doolittle assured him that he had.
There is another interesting story in this Spring 1944 saga that I will have to look up to verify the facts. It occurred in April 1944, I think, and remained a secret until sometime in the 1980s or later. It was a trick mission designed to draw the Luftwaffe up in force once again…it worked.. and the Luftwaffe lost another large number of planes.
The result of all this was that my father, starting his missions in early March 1944, finishing his first tour on June 6th, then flying another 20-missions in late 1944 through March 1945, saw only 3 enemy fighters during his 50-missions! One man’s testament to the effectiveness of Doolittle’s leadership.
Of course, as the war wore on, the danger from flak increased, but that is another story.
Pat
Posted at 14:06h, 27 AprilThis is wonderful information, Rowdy. Your Dad began to fly on or about the same day as my Dad’s last mission – March 6th. I’m studying that now, and you’ve just given an excellent intro. THANKS so much! I value your insights and contributions!
Rowdy
Posted at 10:38h, 28 AprilMy father’s Group started flying their missions in late December 1944, with a beginning supply of about 80 crews and 60 planes. My father was among the first group of replacements for that beginning supply of crews as they started completing their tours.
In all Groups, this rolling replacement activity continued for the duration of the war, which was just over 1-year after my father started flying missions. Since his Group flew their first missions during about the same time period as your father was flying, I suspect their loss rate would be indicative of what your father was facing in his Group.
Of the beginning supply of 80 crews, about half of them were shot down; half of the half were KIA and the other half-half were POW. Those that survived to complete their tours started finishing their tours only about a month after your father completed his tour–you father flew during an especially dangerous time in the war.